Safety integrity level (SIL) verification is a critical step in safety lifecycle of safety-related systems (SRS). Introducing redundancy into SRS raises two issues: voting group configuration and common cause failures (CCF). In order to minimize CCF, diverse redundancy is widely adopted by SRS. However, in the past, almost all attention of SIL verification has been paid to identical redundancy, this is reflected in IEC 61508, ISA-TR84.00.02 and scientific literatures. Therefore, a novel method for SIL verification of SRS with diverse redundancy based on system degradation is proposed. Key idea of the method is to calculate average probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD G ) at each stage of system degradation, which is caused by failures of redundant channels. To validate proposed method, it has been applied on safety shutdown system of Nuclear Power Control Test Facility, and numerical result is compared with FTA and FRANTIC model. Sensitivity studies and comparison of numerical results indicate that the method has very good consistency with FTA and FRANTIC model. Moreover, two sets of general formulae for PFD G of any MooN(D) group with diverse redundancy are provided. From engineering practice point of view, it makes SIL verification process simpler.
Introduction
Safety integrity level (SIL) verification is a critical step in the safety lifecycle of safety-related system (SRS), in accordance with IEC 61508 [1] , to achieve the required SIL for safety functions. SIL verification generally means calculation of average probability of dangerous failure on demand (PFD G ) of a SRS and verifies whether the PFD G of designed SRS meets the required failure measure.
Redundancy is a technique that has been widely used to obtain high reliability and availability in SRS. Introducing redundancy into SRS raises two issues: voting group configuration and common cause failures (CCF). A consistent conclusion on SIL verification is: CCF is the dominant part of the overall PFD G for SRS [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . In order to minimize CCF, diverse redundancy is widely adopted by SRS. However, in the past, almost all attention on SIL verification has been paid to SRS with identical redundancy, and this is reflected in IEC 61508-6 [8] , ISA-TR84.00.02 [9] and scientific literatures.
In most literatures about SIL verification, redundant channels in a voting group are assumed to be statistically independent and identical [10] [11] [12] [13] . However, in many practical applications, not all channels in a voting group can be treated as identical because they have different failure rates and diagnostic coverages, i.e. diverse redundancy. Diverse redundancy refers to the use of two or more different systems, which are built using different components, algorithms, electronics, design methodology etc. to perform the same task. One benefit of diverse redundancy is the increased capabilities to reduce common mode and systematic failures such as those caused by design flaws.
There is clear evidence that diverse redundancy can bring benefits to system reliability. For example, Torres-Echeverría et al. [14] studied design optimization of safety instrumented system (SIS) based on RAMS + C (reliability, availability, maintainability and safety plus cost) addressing IEC 61508 requirements and diverse redundancy, and the results showed that, in general, the design optimization with diversity gives better results than the one without diversity, and introducing diversity as a defense measure against CCF has a positive impact on the functional safety of the SIS, which in turn improves the overall plant safety.
However, it is difficult to quantify these benefits and the effects of diverse redundancy on system reliability. Though less, some research work have been done on the reliability and availability for systems using diverse redundant components. Khatab et al. [15] studied the stationary availability of k-out-of-n: G systems with non-identical n components subject to repair priorities by using a multi-dimensional Markov model, each component is characterized by its own failure rate. Moghaddass et al. [16] evaluated the availability of general k-out-of-n: G systems with non-identical components considering shut-off rules using a finite state-dependent non-homogeneous quasi-birth-death process. These methods for reliability and availability of systems with diverse redundancy are either not proper for SRS or too cumbersome to be applied in engineering practice.
Classical methods, such as RBD, FTA, Markov analysis [17] and Monte Carlo simulation, can be used to verify SIL of diverse redundancy, but with much more complexity or limited accuracy. Kaczor et al. [18] used Monte Carlo simulation through the application of the 2-out-of-N reliability structure and the sectioning off of so-called voting zones to verify SIL and reduce the number of false alarms, but the method requires specialist software and is time-consuming, and the results depend on the quality of pseudo-random numbers generator and simulation parameters. Rausand [19] gave an approach to determine PFD G for MooN voting group of N independent and nonidentical channels by using Simplified Formulas method. This approach is easy to be used in practice, however, it only takes dangerous undetected (DU) failures into account, and does not consider dangerous detected (DD) failures and CCF, and details can be found on p. 203-205 of [19] .
Therefore, a novel method for SIL verification of SRS with diverse redundancy, which is based on system degradation using reliability block diagram (RBD), is proposed in this paper. This paper is a further development of the authors' previous work [20] which studied the SIL verification of systems with identical redundant channels from the perspective of system degradation, the aim of this paper is to present a new simpler and more accurate SIL verification method for SRS with diverse redundancy design in harmony with IEC 61508 requirements. Two important issues when introducing diverse redundancy into SRS are voting group configuration and probability of CCF [14, 21] . In this system degradation based method, CCF part of PFD G is quantified by using the multi-β factor model [22] introduced in PDS method [23] by SINTEF, new information are the quantification method for independent part of PFD G and two sets of general formulae to determine PFD G of any MooN(D) voting group with diverse redundancy, which are the new contributions of this paper. Some other generalized formulae for identical redundancy can be found in [2] [3] [4] 13, 24, 25] .
The key idea of the method proposed is to perform RBD analysis and calculate PFD G at each stage of system degradation, which is caused by failures of redundant channels. System degradation is the property resulted from redundant channels' failures in a multi-channel system, and it enables a system to continue operating properly in the event of failures until the system's fault tolerance reaches zero. Based on degradation processes, from fully functioning to degraded functioning until the system could not execute safety function on demand any more, this paper dynamically discusses the RBDs of safety architectures and gives combined RBDs composed of each stage-RBD. Based on the RBDs obtained, formulae of PFD G for a voting group could be written out straightforwardly according to degradation processes, and equivalent mean down time (MDT) of one channel and one voting group are also calculated based on degradation processes. The method takes DU failures, DD failures and CCF into account, it is more accurate than Simplified Formulas method. To validate credibility of the proposed method and equations derived, the method has been applied on safety shutdown system of Nuclear Power Control Test Facility (NPCTF) at The University of Western Ontario, and also a general comparison of numerical results among this method, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and FRANTIC are made to demonstrate correctness of the method. The FRANTIC (Formal Reliability Analysis including Normal Testing, Inspection, and Checking) is a set of computational procedures developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States in the 80's and solves the problem by numerical integration of the time-dependent system unavailability (PFD G ) function built from the logical combination of individual component unavailability functions [26, 27] . The comparisons demonstrate that the numerical result is very close to the results calculated with FTA and the FRANTIC, and sensitivity study results of failure rate and proof test interval indicate that the method has very good consistency with FTA and FRANTIC model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Problem statement and assumptions are presented in Section 2. Section 3 gives RBDs of different voting groups and detailed calculation processes of PFD G . In Section 4, results and discussion are presented. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
Problem statement and assumptions
For SIL verification of systems using diverse redundancy, especially hardware of SRS, IEC equations [8] and ISA equations [9] cannot be used as they are proposed for identical redundancy. Classical reliability analysis methods, such as RBD, FTA and MA, can be used to verify SIL of diverse redundancy, but with much more complexity or limited accuracy. Fig. 1 shows usability and accuracy of existing reliability analysis methods for SIL verification of SRS.
When used for SIL verification of SRS, RBD, FTA and SE cover few aspects of the system's safety-related behavior: these methods consider failure rates only, and do not consider repair rates and system degradation states. They are static analysis methods and ease to use, however accuracy is limited.
MA, Petri net and Monte Carlo simulation could cover more aspects of the system's safety-related behavior: these methods could consider failure rates, repair rates and system degradation states by using state transition. They are dynamic analysis methods, and more accurate, but with much more application complexity for complex redundant SRS. Therefore specialized knowledge and skills are required.
Hybrid techniques are normally combination of two or more methods presented above, and they are various and case-by-case. Compared to identical redundancy, all the methods above are more complicated when used for diverse redundancy.
This system degradation based method is a dynamic SIL verification method, and each operational stage due to system degradation can be considered as a system state. This method can be easily used in engineering practice to deal with SIL verification of diverse redundancy with reasonable accuracy. In order to describe the degradation processes and PFD G calculations as clearly as possible, the following assumptions are made as a basis.
i. All channels in a voting group are independent and diverse, except common cause failures; ii. Component failure rates are constant over the life of the system, and components (or blocks representing them in RBD) can exist in only two states: working ("up" state) or failed ("down" state); iii. All channels in a voting group are fully functioning after start-up of the system; iv. For each safety function, there is a perfect proof testing and repair,
i.e. all failures that remain undetected are detected by the proof test;
v. The proof test interval is at least an order of magnitude greater than the MRT; vi. For each system, there is a single T 1 and MTTR: the fraction of failures specified by the diagnostic coverage is both detected and repaired within the MTTR. MTTR includes the diagnostic test interval which is typically less than 1 h, the remaining being the MRT; vii. Failures of individual components are considered to be statistically independent events. viii. λ D,i is failure rate of the ith failed channel and λ D,j is failure rate of the jth failed channel, for i < j, λ D,i > λ D,j . In other words, the first failed channel has highest failure rate and shortest MTTF (mean time to failure, MTTF =1/λ), and the last failed channel has lowest failure rate and longest MTTF. Then for a MooN voting group,
. Therefore, the results of PFD G obtained by using the proposed method are conservative.
3. RBD and PFD G 3.1. Voting group Table 1 shows typical used architectures and their primary attributes. The term "Safety Fault Tolerance" indicates the number of extra units that exists to maintain safety (avoid the fail-danger state). The term "Availability Fault Tolerance" indicates the number of extra units that exists to maintain availability (avoid the fail-safe state) [28] . These terms are an expansion of the term "Hardware Fault Tolerance" from IEC 61508.
Four of the architectures, 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2 and 2oo3, have existed since the early days of relay logic. Three of the architectures, 2oo3, 1oo2D, and 2oo2D, have become common in commercial implementations that provide both high safety and high availability, but with bias towards safety or availability. The architectures with the D designation have one or more output switches controlled by automatic diagnostics. These diagnostics are used to control system failure modes and to modify the failure behavior of units within the system. The D architectures provide excellent performance for both safety and availability, which depend on exceptionally good diagnostic coverage. For more details about these architectures and their relationships, refer to [28] .
SIS designers need to select proper architecture as voting group to meet a determined required SIL level. For that, a fundamental task is the PFD evaluation of different voting groups. Both IEC 61508-6 [8] and ISA-TR84.00.02 [9] provide such equations for PFD evaluation of above typical SIS architectures. However, from time to time, SIL analysts face situations where they need to evaluate the PFD of higher redundancy architectures [2] , and actual commercial architectures vary considerably and may even be combinations of the typical architectures above. Therefore, besides those most widely used architectures, this paper also provides two sets of general formulae for PFD G of any MooN(D) voting group with diverse redundancy.
Multi-β factor model with diverse redundancy
A MooN voting group with diverse redundant channels considering DU failures, DD failures and CCF is shown in Fig. 2 , redundant channels has different failure rates, i.e., for i≠ j,
, and
, . The multi-β factor model [23] is used to incorporate effects of CCF, where the multiplicity of the CCF (i.e. number of channels affected) is explicitly treated. In early version of IEC 61508-6, the single-β factor model was introduced to quantify CCF. In single-β factor model, the factor β represents the fraction of failures that have a common cause. The problem with single-β factor model is that for any MooN voting, the rate of dependent failures is the same. So the single-β factor model does not distinguish between different voting logics, and the same result is obtained e.g. for 1oo2, 1oo3 and 2oo3 voted systems [22] .
Due to the limitations of the single-β factor model for CCF, the PDS method [23] provided an extension of the single-β factor model, i.e. the multi-β factor model, which is suggested in the new version IEC 61508-6 published in 2010 [8] .
In PDS method [23] , the multi-β factor model explicitly depends on the configuration, and the β factor of a MooN voting logic is expressed as: β(MooN) = β ⋅ C MooN , where C MooN is a modification factor for various voting configurations, and β is the factor obtained for 1oo2 voting group, which can be determined by using the checklist in IEC 61508-6.
The original multi-β factor model was defined for identical redundant channels with the same constant failure rate. However, diverse redundant channels are non-identical and have different failure rates. In this case it is more difficult to select the "joint" failure rate for inclusion of CCFs. To account for CCFs in this situation, following two approaches are introduced by [23] to select a "joint" failure rate for the diverse channels:
1. Using some representative average value, typically the geometric mean of the CCF failure rates of the diverse channels [22] . 2. Using the lowest failure rate of the diverse channels.
For diverse redundant channels using the geometric mean has often been the preferred method [23] . This is an adequate approach if the failure rates are of the same magnitude. The second approach is suggested to use the lowest failure rate when the failure rates have different order of magnitude, refer to [23] for discussion about the use of these two approaches.
In this paper, the geometric mean approach is used to quantify CCFs. Let λ DU,i be DU failure rate of the ith failed channel, for i=1, 2, …, N. The geometric mean of the N DU failure rates is
Then, the independent DU failure rate λ DU of the ith failed channel becomes
Similarly, the geometric mean of the N DD failure rates is
Then, the independent DD failure rate λ DD of the ith failed channel becomes
According to the multi-β factor model, PFD contributed by CCF of a MooN voting group is
Where, C MooN is configuration factor, some recommended values of C MooN for MooN architectures by PDS method [23] are given in Table 2 . The authors of PDS method also investigated field experience on CCFs, through presentation and derivation of generic values of β-factors for typical components in the oil and gas industry, and the demonstration of how failure data may be used to construct checklists for updating the value of β in operation, based on a review of some 12,000 maintenance notifications from six different onshore and offshore petroleum facilities [29] .
Diversity leads to a reduction in probability of failure due to CCF, due to a reduced β factor as compared to the β factor for identical redundancy. The methodology discussed in Annex D of IEC 61508-6 [8] states that diversity is one of the most effective mechanisms to reduce the β factor. One reason for this is that CCF of diverse channels are likely to be non-simultaneous, thus increasing the probability of the diagnostic tests detecting the failure. [2, 19] use mean down time (MDT) to represents mean unavailable time of functional safety due to failures. There are researchers argue that MDT is mean non-operational time due to repair action, i.e. MDT =1/u, where u is repair rate, and it should be differentiated from the time for a component being "down due to a dangerous undetected failure", because in the latter case, a dangerous undetected failure has occurred and the component is still working. However, the component is not able to deal with a failure of the "system being under control". So, it is inappropriate to use MDT to represent mean unavailable time of functional safety due to failures. Therefore, in the process of equations derivation, to avoid misunderstanding, this paper defines MUnT (Mean Unavailable Time of Functional Safety) and MAT (Mean Available Time of Functional Safety) to replace MDT (Mean Down Time) and MUT (Mean Up Time), and keep MDT with the meaning of mean non-operational time due to repair action. In the authors' opinion, MUnT and MAT are more appropriate to represent the availability time of functional safety of SIS due to failures. Other notations and acronyms are the same with IEC 61508 and other papers.
For generalization, assume that a channel consists of n components connected in series, with respective failure rates:
Detailed derivation of Eqs. (6) and (7) are provided in Appendix 1.1.
2oo2 voting group
2oo2 voting group consists of two channels connected in parallel so that both channels need to demand the safety function before it can take place. Any channel's failure would result in the failure of voting group, so, the RBD of 2oo2 voting group is two RBDs of 1oo1 voting group connected in series as shown in Fig. 3 .
PFD G of 1oo1 voting group [20] is
where,
These two equations are proved by many literatures, such as [17] . Therefore, according to the RBD as shown in Fig. 3 , for 2oo2 voting group,
2oo2D voting group
It should be noted that actually all architectures have diagnostic channels, but the diagnostic channels in a MooND architecture would report the fault detected and change output states or output voting, while the diagnostic channel in a MooN architecture would only report the fault detected and would not change any output states or output voting, therefore, a MooND architecture and a MooN architecture may have different reactions when a fault is detected.
Similarly, the RBD of 2oo2D voting group is two RBDs of 1oo1D voting group connected in series as shown in Fig. 4 . DD failures are not considered here because any DD failure leads the process into a safety state, this is the same situation in MooND voting group when the voting group has no more fault tolerance.
For 1oo1 voting group, λ DD will not change any output states, so λ DD will still cause dangerous failures on demand, the equivalent mean down time is
For 1oo1D voting group, λ DD will change output states and result in safety state, so λ DD has no contribution for t' CE and is omitted, the equivalent mean down time is
Therefore, according to the RBD as shown in Fig. 4 , for 2oo2D voting group,
3.6. 1oo2 voting group 1oo2 voting group consists of two channels connected in parallel, thus there would have to be a dangerous failure in both channels before a safety function failed on demand, and it can degrade to continue operating when a dangerous failure causes the failure of any one channel.
After the system is started and until any one channel is failed to execute functional safety, both two channels are working, any channel's failure will result in a degradation of the system to 1oo1 voting group, and the RBD of the system in this stage is shown in Fig. 5-1 . Based on Eqs. (6) and (7), replace λ 1 , λ 2 with λ DU , λ DD , then exclude CCF represented by the multi-β factor model, the probability of dangerous failure of any one channel in the voting group is 
Fig . 3 . 2oo2 voted group.
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where λ DU ind ,1 and λ DD ind ,1 are independent DU failure rate and independent DD failure rate of the first failed channel respectively, and 
After degrade to 1oo1 voting group, the 1oo2 voting group would fail completely if any dangerous failure in this remaining channel occurs, so the MAT of the remaining channel (from the system starts working to the system is unavailable to execute functional safety) is the voting group equivalent mean up time, and the MUnT of the remaining channel is the voting group equivalent mean down time t GE . The RBD in this stage is shown in Fig. 5-2 . The probability of dangerous failure of this remaining channel in the voting group is
and
where
Under the condition that any one of the two channels has failed, the reliability of the component with failure rate λ DU ind ,2 in the remaining channel is R t e e ( ) = 2(1 − )
Consider λT e λT λT λT
, then similar to [17] , 
So,
Here, it can be seen that, the MUnT of DU failures of 1oo2 voting group with diverse redundancy can be assumed not related to failure rates, and it is the same as the MUnT of DU failures of 1oo2 voting group with identical redundancy [8, 20] , i.e. MUnT can be assumed not influenced by diverse redundancy. It is said "can be assumed" because Taylor Series is used, and higher order terms which are normally very small are ignored. To prove the point, MUnT of DU failures can also be determined by Simplified Formulas in [19] , proving details are provided in Appendix 1.2.
Therefore, the equivalent mean down time of 1oo2 voting group is
Using multi-β factor model, probability of failure due to CCF is
where, λ DU and λ DD are geometric means of λ DU,i and λ DD,i of the voting group respectively, for i=1, 2, …, N.
Combine the RBDs above of two operation stages of the system and consider CCF as shown in Fig. 5-3 , the combined RBD of this voting group is shown in Fig. 5-4 .
This system degradation based method is a dynamic SIL verification method, and each operational stage due to system degradation can be considered as a system state. Based on the consecutive states of degradation process, the independent part of PFD G can be calculated as "PFD 1 *PFD 2 ". Consequently, based on Eqs. (10), (11) and (12), consider CCF, for 1oo2 voting group,
3.7. 1oo2D voting group 1oo2D voting group consists of two channels connected in parallel, the group could degrade to continue operating in 1oo1D voting group if any one channel is down.
After the system is started and until any one channel is failed to execute functional safety, both two channels are working, any detected failure in any channel would cause a safety shutdown of the channel and then the system degrades to continue operating in 1oo1D voting group, i.e., λ DD and λ SD both will lead to a degradation of the system. As a result, λ DD and λ SD are both taken into account in the RBD of this stage as shown in Fig. 6-1 . Considering CCF, the probability of failures of any one channel in this architecture is
(Diagnostic Coverage [8] ). Based on Eq. (6) and t CE for 1oo1 voting group, here 
After degrade to 1oo1D voting group, the 1oo2D voting group would fail completely if any dangerous undetected failure in this remaining channel occurs, so the MUnT of the remaining channel is the voting group equivalent mean down time t' GE . The RBD in this stage is like the RBD of 1oo1D voting group, as shown in Fig. 6-2 .
The probability of dangerous failure of the remaining channel is 
Based on calculation of t GE for 1oo2 voting group, here
Combine two stages' RBDs above and consider CCF as shown in Fig. 5-3 , the combined RBD of 1oo2D voting group is shown in Fig. 6-3 .
Consequently, based on Eqs. (14) and (15), consider CCF, for 1oo2D voting group,
2oo3 voting group
2oo3 voting group consists of three channels connected in parallel, thus there would have to be dangerous failures in any two channels before a safety function failed on demand, and it can degrade to continue operating when a dangerous failure causes the failure of any one channel.
All three channels are functioning after the system is started, then the group degrades to 2oo2 voting group to continue operating after any one channel is failed.
So the RBDs of two operation stages shown in Fig. 7 -1 and 7-2 are just like 1oo2 voting group, the only difference between 2oo3 voting group and 1oo2 voting group is the number of working channels in two operation stages.
The combined RBD of 2oo3 voting group is shown in Fig. 7-3 . With the same analysis method for 1oo2 voting group, in 2oo3 voting group,
Based on calculation of t CE for 1oo2 voting group, here According to its sub-RBD as shown in Fig. 7-2 Here, it can be seen that, since Taylor Series is used, and higher order terms of Taylor Series are ignored, the MUnT of DU failures of 2oo3 voting group can be assumed not influenced by diverse redundancy, and it is the same as the MUnT of DU failures of 2oo3 voting group with identical redundancy [8, 20] . The point could also be proved by using Simplified Formulas, proving details are provided in Appendix 1.3.
Therefore, the equivalent mean down time of 2oo3 voting group is
Consequently, based on Eqs. (17) and (18), consider CCF, for 2oo3 voting group,
2oo3D voting group
Like 2oo3 voting group, all three channels of 2oo3D voting group are functioning after system starts to work, and the group could degrade to 2oo2D voting group to continue operating after any one channel is failed.
The RBDs of two operation stages are shown in Fig. 8-1 and 8-2 and they are like 1oo2D voting group, the only difference between 2oo3D voting group and 1oo2D voting group is the number of working channels in two operation stages.
The combined RBD of 2oo3D voting group is shown in Fig. 8-3 . With the same analysis method for 1oo2D voting group, in 2oo3D voting group, 
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PFD C λ t λ t = ′ = 2 ′ DU ind GE DU ind GE 2 2 1 ,2 ,2(21)
1oo3 voting group
1oo3 voting group consists of three channels connected in parallel, thus there would have to be dangerous failures in all three channels before a safety function failed on demand, and it can degrade to continue operating when dangerous failures causes the failures of any two channels.
1oo3 voting group could degrade two times and it has three operation stages, the RBDs of three operation stages are shown in Fig. 9-1, Fig. 9-2 and Fig. 9-3 
Based on calculation of t CE and t GE for 2oo3 voting group, here After degrade to 1oo1 voting group to continue operating, the 1oo3 voting group would fail completely if any dangerous failure occurs in this remaining channel, so the MUnT of the remaining channel is the voting group equivalent mean down time t G2E . The RBD in this stage is shown in Fig. 9-3 . The probability of dangerous failure of this last channel in the group is
According to its sub-RBD as shown in Fig. 9-3 so
Here, it can be seen that, since Taylor Series is used, and high order terms of Taylor Series are ignored, the MUnT of DU failures of 1oo3 voting group can be assumed not influenced by diverse redundancy, and it is the same as the MUnT of DU failures of 1oo3 voting group with identical redundancy [8, 20] . The point could also be proved by using Simplified Formulas, proving details are provided in Appendix 1.4.
Therefore, the equivalent mean down time of 1oo3 voting group is Consequently, based on Eqs. (23), (24) and (25), consider CCF, for 1oo3 voting group,
From the system degradation point of view, the combined RBDs given in this paper, in fact, are not genuine RBDs in the real sense. They are combinations of all RBDs of consecutive stages of system operation, including degraded operation stages. In those RBDs, channels labeled with different MUnTs (t CE , t GE and t G2E ) represent different operation stages of the voting group.
MooN(D) voting group
Consider a MooN(D) voting group of N independent and nonidentical channels. The DU failure rate of channel j is λ DU,j and the channels are proof-tested at the same time with test interval T 1 . The proof-testing is assumed to be perfect such that all DU faults are revealed by the test.
For a MooN voting group, based on system degradation method, from group is started to failed to demand, the group has (N -M +1) operation stages, Fig. 8 . 2oo3D voted group.
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where, Consequently, based on Eqs. (27)- (30), consider CCF, for MooN voting group,
Similarly, for a MooND voting group, 
Results and discussion

Results
From the system degradation point of view, in Section 3, this paper presents RBDs of each operation stage and gives a combined RBD for several classical voting groups with diverse redundancy. In addition, based on degradation processes, PFD G for voting groups are calculated, and two sets of general formulae to assess PFD G of any MooN(D) voting group with diverse redundancy are given.
To validate credibility of the proposed method and equations derived, a demonstration is given below for an illustration purpose about how the method can be applied to industry systems. Numerical results are compared with FTA method [32] and FRANTIC [26, 27] , sensitivity studies of failure rate and proof test interval on PFD G are given. Following is a general comparison of numerical results among this method, FTA and FRANTIC to demonstrate correctness of the method. 
Demonstration on safety shutdown system of NPCTF
This demonstration is performed on safety shutdown system of NPCTF. There are two shutdown systems on NPCTF: SDS1 and SDS2. Either of them can trip NPCTF. For high-temperature trip safety function, architecture of the shutdown system is shown in Fig. 10 .
Sensor subsystem includes three identical temperature sensors which constitute a 2oo3 voting group. Logic subsystem includes an analog input module, a controller and a digital output module which is a 1oo1 configuration. The actuator subsystem is a 1oo2 configuration composed of two diverse shutdown channels, either of the two shutdown channels can trip the heater process on demand.
Since incompleteness of the reliability database, failure rates for components used in this demonstration case come from the database [30, 31] , and failure rate for logic subsystem comes from an example in IEC 61508-6 [8] .
Strictly, overall failure rate of every subsystem channel should be determined by FMEDA, however, since this demonstration is given for an illustration purpose, an assumption is made on that overall failure rate of each shutdown channel of actuator subsystem is summation of the failure rates of components composing that shutdown channel. Besides, for simplicity and convenience, other two assumptions commonly used in IEC 61508-6 are made here, one is that dangerous failure rate is equal to safe failure rate for all subsystem channels, i.e. λ D = λ S =50% * λ, another is that for CCF of sensor subsystem, β=10%, β D =5%. For the case study, a proof test period of one year is assumed.
Since sensors and actuators have no self-diagnostic function, diagnostic coverage (DC) of sensors and actuators are 0. Since two actuator channels are independent and completely different, the actuator subsystem is diverse redundancy and there is no CCF. Therefore, architecture of shutdown system on NPCTF can be simplified as shown in Fig. 11 with reliability data.
Numerical results of the case study are given in Table 3 . As can be seen from Table 3 , this system degradation based method gives very close results with FTA and FRANTIC. Besides, compared with FTA and FRANTIC, it can be seen that although quite close, this paper tends to give lightly conservative values. This is explained by the assumption viii that the first failed channel has highest failure rate, and the last failed channel has lowest failure rate, so the results of PFD G obtained by using the proposed method are conservative.
Detailed procedures of the three methods for the case study are put in Appendix 2, 3, 4 to provide sufficient information. For more information about FTA and FRANTIC, interested readers can refer to [26, 27, 32] .
Sensitivity Study
To give a more concrete proof of credibility of this method, sensitivity studies of failure rate and proof test interval on NPCTF shutdown system are performed. Sensitivity study of failure rate is performed with λ T2-1 varying from 10 −7 /h to 10
/h, and sensitivity study of proof test interval is performed with test interval of sensor T2-1 varying from 1 to 24 months, other parameters keep the same with the demonstration case before.
Sensitivity study of λ T2-1 is shown in Fig. 12 , which shows very good consistence among the proposed method, FTA and the FRANTIC model.
Sensitivity study of test interval of sensor T2-1 is shown in Fig. 13 , which also shows very good consistence among the proposed method, FTA and the FRANTIC model.
General comparison of numerical results
A general comparison of numerical results among this method, FTA and FRANTIC are given below to demonstrate correctness of the method. Besides, CCF part and the independent part is split for the comparison of numerical results.
The architectures used in the comparison are 2oo2, 2oo2D, 1oo2, 1oo2D, 2oo3, 2oo3D and 1oo3, they are explicitly mentioned in IEC 61508-6 [8] and IEC 61131-6 [33] . Three proof test intervals are used for each architecture, which are: 1 year, 2 years and 5 years. Different failure rates are assumed to the redundant channels. The PFD G results for the various architectures are given in Table 4 . Since for 2oo2 voting and 2oo2D voting, both channels need to demand the safety function at all the time, so there is no need to consider CCF separately.
As can be seen from Table 4 , the numerical values obtained with all three methods are close to each other for all architectures and proof test intervals. In comparison with FTA and FRANTIC, it can be seen that although quite close, the proposed method tends to give slightly higher values for independent part of PFD G , and similar to [2] , FRANTIC tends to give lower values. This is explained by the assumption viii that the first failed channel has highest failure rate, and the last failed channel has lowest failure rate, so the results of PFD G obtained by using the proposed method are more conservative. However, since CCF contributes much more to PFD G , the discrepancies of independent parts can be considered insignificant.
Discussion
SIL verification is essentially reliability prediction, and there is no way to know the real probability value of reliability. Each method for reliability prediction uses some kind of simplification and approximation, and uncertainty comes from many aspects including the basic failure rates of electronic components. In the authors' opinion, to evaluate the accuracy of a method, the numerical results could show Fig. 10 . Architecture of safety shutdown system on NPCTF. some credibility is one side, the other side is the system's safety-related behavior that the method could cover. Markov model is known as more accurate method, because it can cover most aspects of the system's safety-related behavior except the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis.
Compared to SIL verification of systems using identical redundancy, research on SIL verification of systems using diverse redundancy is more universal, more difficult and more complicated. A method for SIL verification of identical redundancy can not necessarily be used for diverse redundancy, or can be used for diverse redundancy but with much more complexity such as FTA and Markov analysis.
Compared to traditional reliability analysis methods such as FTA and Markov analysis for SIL verification of diverse redundancy, this system degradation based method can be easily used in engineering practice, and could make the SIL verification process simpler, from the engineering point of view. Compared to the Simplified Formulas given for diverse channels by reference [19] , this system degradation based method considers more elements and details: λ DD failure rate, diagnostic coverage, inclusion of the effect of CCF, restoration time of faulty component and dynamic degradation processes. This method provides more details and accuracy in reliability analysis, in the authors' opinion, it is more accurate compared to Simplified Note: "Ind" and "CCF" represent independent part and CCF part of PFD for sensor subsystem. Fig. 12 . Sensitivity studies of failure rate on shutdown system. Fig. 13 . Sensitivity studies of proof test interval on shutdown system.
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Formulas method given in reference [19] . So far, this paper does not consider the parameter repair rates and staggered testing patterns. Another drawback is that components with constant failure rates. Some components have increasing failure rates due to aging, the modeling of time-variant failure rates for SIL verification is worth further study. And although CCF is quantified by using the multi-β factor model to treat the multiplicity of CCF, the β factor for 1oo2 voting group is still determined by using the checklist in IEC 61508-6. Whilst there is a clear evidence that diverse redundancy can reduce CCF, but it is much too difficult to quantify the effects of diverse redundancy on CCF, i.e. how much CCF could be reduced by using diverse redundancy? This question is worth further study.
Conclusions
IEC 61508 requires SIL verification for SRS. This study is a further development of the previous work done by the authors, with the aim of developing a SIL verification method for SRS with diverse redundancy in harmony with IEC 61508 requirements. Since most research work that has already been done is focusing on systems with identical redundancy, while diverse redundancy is widely used in engineering practice to minimize CCF, this paper tries using the authors' system degradation based method to verify SIL of systems with diverse redundancy.
In this system degradation based method for SIL verification of diverse redundancy, the CCF part of PFD G is existing knowledge from PDS method produced by SINTEF, and new contribution is the quantification method for independent part of PFD G . The system degradation based method has been applied on safety shutdown system of Nuclear Power Control Test Facility, sensitivity studies and a general comparison of numerical results indicate that the method has very good consistency with FTA and FRANTIC model, which demonstrates correctness of the proposed method. Results also show that this method can be easily used in engineering practice to deal with SIL verification of diverse redundancy with reasonable accuracy. Besides, this paper gives two sets of general formulae for SIL verification of any MooN(D) system with independent and nonidentical channels, i.e. diverse redundancy. The two sets of general formulae can also be used for identical redundancy. Before replacement, the reliability of the channel is R t e ( ) = ;
after replacement, the reliability of the channel is R t e ( ) = .
λt − Comparing two equations above, λ λ λ = + . 1 2 Before replacement, the probability of the channel in available state is
after replacement, the probability of the channel in available state is For a channel consists of n components connected in series, The last approximation follows because of using Taylor Series, e e e e λ λ λ λ λ λ T and probability distribution function of 1oo3 voting group is
Then, MUnT of DU failures of 1oo3 voting group is
The last approximation follows because of using Taylor Series, 
When λ DU,j T 1 is small, Here, it can be seen that, since Taylor Series is used, and high order terms of Taylor Series are ignored, the MUnT of DU failures of MooN voting group can be assumed not influenced by diverse redundancy.
Therefore, the equivalent mean down time of MooN voting group is 
2. System degradation method of case study 
